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COMMENT
BARGAINING IN THE DARK: WHY THE 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE SHOULD 
RENDER “NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY” 
CLAUSES VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC 




In the high-risk world of construction, a contractor’s ability to 
recover damages associated with project delays caused by other parties 
can mean the difference between realizing expected profits and suffering 
harsh financial losses.1 This Comment addresses the enforceability of 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California; M.L.I.S. University of Rhode Island, 2004, Kingston, Rhode Island; B.A. Journalism, 
2001, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona.  I would like thank my husband, Charan, for his 
boundless love, friendship, and patience.  I would also like to thank Professor Jon Sylvester and 
Adjunct Professor Christine Tour-Sarkissian for their guidance.  Finally, I am especially grateful to 
the members of the Golden Gate University Law Review Editorial Board, without whose insightful 
feedback, dedication, and expertise this Comment would not have been published. 
1 J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public 
Policy Issue, 75 FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001) (“A contractor who experiences delays during 
performance is likely to incur increased costs.”); see also ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL.,
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR 49 (3d ed. 2011), available at
Westlaw CDRTC § 2.03 (noting the “enormous economic impact of construction delays due to the 
highly time-sensitive nature of construction costs”); id. § 2.01 (“The typical contractor’s profit 
margin—the percentage difference between revenues and costs—is very small in comparison to its 
risk exposure. . . . [O]n almost every construction project, it is possible to lose much more money 
than it is possible to make.  It is not unusual for a job that constitutes only five percent of a large 
contractor’s business to have the potential to destroy 50 percent or more of the company’s net 
1
Sarjapur: “No Damage For Delay” Clauses
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
284 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
                                                                                                                                 
“no damage for delay” clauses, (hereinafter sometimes called NDFD 
clauses),2 which bar contractors from recovering any delay damages, 
even when delay has been caused by an owner or its agents.3
The potentially devastating real-world consequences to contractors 
of a broadly worded “no damage for delay” clause are well-illustrated in 
the case of Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States.4
In the summer of 1996, the United States Air Force awarded a 
$17,724,714.00 federal contract to Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham (Harper) 
for the demolition, removal, and replacement of 143 base housing units 
in California.5  In order to complete the work, Harper then signed a 
$720,500.00 subcontract with contractor KCI to perform certain 
landscape and irrigation services between July 1997 and January 1998.6
Significantly, the form contract between Harper and subcontractor KCI 
contained an NDFD clause stating that in the event of any delays, even
those caused by the fault of Harper or the United States government,
KCI would be barred from recovering any monetary damages.7  KCI’s 
general manager, who signed the subcontract, later testified that KCI had 
believed the NDFD clause to be “a boilerplate phrase that’s contained in 
most contracts that’s generally ignored because it’s not enforceable.”8
Unfortunately, KCI’s reliance on industry belief,9 as well as previous 
common-law and statutory treatment,10 proved highly damaging. 
worth.”); 5 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:1 (2011), available at Westlaw BOCL § 15:1 (stating that during 
construction projects, the “unexcused, untimely completion of scheduled activities can result in 
enormous liabilities to all parties far exceeding anticipated profits and, at times, individual net 
worth”).
2 These clauses are also known as “No Damage” or “No Damages for Delay” clauses.  
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause with Respect to 
Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187, § 1[a] (1976). 
3 See id. § 1[c]. 
4 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2008) 
(applying California law in a federal case). 
5 Id. at 669. 
6 Id. at 670. 
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE 
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/ 
articles/public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-
federal-public-works-projects-in-california (“Many California practitioners believe that the [rule 
against ‘no damage for delay’ clauses] does or should extend generally to all construction contracts, 
both public and private.”); see Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” 
Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION LAW 9, 10 (1985) (“California construction lawyers have long felt that a 
‘no damage for delay’ clause would not be enforced where unreasonable delays have been caused by 
the project owner.”); Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction 
2
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Due to the work delays of another contractor hired by the United 
States, Harper’s progress in completing its own work was delayed by 
three months, which caused “a domino effect that pushed KCI’s work 
into the rainy season.”11  KCI was consequently unable to complete its 
work until August of 1998, 223 days later than originally scheduled, and 
alleged that it was further delayed as a result of the federal government’s 
failure to issue final acceptance of the landscaping.12  KCI estimated that 
the delays of Harper and the Air Force had directly caused it to incur 
$770,565.00 in increased performance costs, an amount greater than the 
original contract price.13  To recover its costs, KCI sued Harper, and as 
part of a “Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release” between the 
parties, Harper agreed to pass through KCI’s claim as against the Air 
Force.14  However, when the United States Court of Federal Claims 
determined that the NDFD clause between private contractors was 
enforceable under California law, KCI was forced to absorb the total 
costs of damages caused by other parties’ delays.15
Law and Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP, 14-15 (May 2008), 
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf 
(providing results of a survey of state law firms, in which the responses provided by three California 
firms with construction law practices indicated that “no damage for delay” clauses were not 
enforceable in the state); Daniel R. Frost, No-Damages-for-Delay Clauses—They Still Work,
HOLLAND & HART LLP CONSTRUCTION LAW UPDATE 1, 3 (Jan. 2000), 
www.hollandhart.com/articles/99200.pdf?CFID=8840471&CFTOKEN=95709572 (“Conventional 
wisdom is that enforcement of no-damages-for-delay clauses is becoming harder and harder, if not 
completely impossible.  As a result, those clauses receive less and less attention in the negotiating 
and administration process.  In fact, at times, they are simply ignored, whether in or out of the 
contract.”).
10 STEPHEN J. FOWLER, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3D §27:85 (2010), 
available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:85 (explaining that “‘No Damage for Delay’ provisions in 
construction contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder are generally unenforceable in 
California,” and that while such clauses are typically enforced in private contracts, they are strictly 
construed and are “rarely enforced to preclude the recovery of costs incurred by reason of owner-
caused delays”). 
11 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 670. 
12 Id. at 670-71. 
13 Id. at 671. 
14 KCI had no direct privity of contract with the federal government and thus was unable to 
sue the Air Force directly to recover its delay damages.  In exchange for KCI’s agreement to dismiss 
its lawsuit against Harper with prejudice, Harper agreed to “pass through” KCI’s claim to the federal 
government under the Severin Doctrine.  However, before a claim can be passed through to the 
federal government by a prime contractor under the Severin Doctrine, the prime contractor has the 
burden of proving that it is liable to the subcontractor for the damages sustained.  The federal 
government moved for summary judgment, alleging that Harper could not demonstrate liability to 
KCI because of the NDFD clause in the contract between the parties.  The court held that NDFD 
clauses were enforceable as between private contractors in California, and fell outside the scope of 
California Public Contract Code section 7102, which limits the enforceability of NDFD clauses in 
public construction contracts.  Id. at 676. 
15 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 679. 
3
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As this case suggests, delays are a frequent subject of construction 
litigation16 because of their potential to inflate expenses for owners and 
contractors, beyond those anticipated at the time of contracting.17  It is 
therefore not surprising that owners would seek contractual methods of 
shifting the risks associated with delay to other parties.18  As 
demonstrated in Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, one tool employed for this 
purpose is an NDFD clause.19  These exculpatory clauses vary widely in 
form, but they generally seek to deny a contractor20 the right to recover 
delay damages, including those caused by the delay of an owner or its 
agents.21  “No damage for delay” clauses have been a subject of 
longstanding controversy in the construction industry22 because of their 
potential to cause significant monetary losses to contractors in the event 
of owner-caused delays.23
In 1984, the California legislature enacted California Public 
Contract Code section 7102, which renders NDFD clauses void in public 
works contracts when owners are responsible for delays that are deemed 
“unreasonable” and “not within the contemplation of the parties.”24
16 See BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 
16.03 (4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL § 16.03 (noting that delay claims have become a 
common occurrence in the construction industry). 
17 A.B.A. FORUM ON THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 
BOOK, 117 (Daniel S. Brennan et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008) (stating that in the event of delay, 
contractors’ delay damages may include “increased labor and materials costs, extended job-site and 
home-office overhead, lost alternative job opportunities, and increased general conditions costs 
(including equipment rental, utilities charges, and site security).  The contractor may also face claims 
from subcontractors affected by the delay.”); see Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY 
CLAIMS at § 1.01. 
18 Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857 
(2005). 
19 Id.
20 Throughout this Comment the author will refer to the party seeking to enforce an NDFD 
clause as “owner” and the party against whom an NDFD clause operates as “contractor.”  However, 
NDFD clauses may also bind subcontractors through application of “flow down” provisions 
incorporated in prime construction contracts, or through their inclusion in contracts formed between 
contractors and subcontractors.  PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER &
O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:32 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL § 3:32 [hereinafter 
CONSTRUCTION LAW]; see Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. 667. 
21 Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With 
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 1[c] (1976). 
22 See Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 
WASH. L. REV. 471, 471 (1978); see also Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 
2.16. 
23 See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L.
REV. at 472. 
24 CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011) (“Contract provisions in construction 
contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder which limit the contractee’s liability to an 
4
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However, section 7102 is inadequate to protect contractors from the 
harsh consequences associated with the ineffective and unfair NDFD 
clause, because it places limitations on the protection afforded to 
contractors in public works contracts and has no effect on private 
construction contracts.25  These inadequacies have become more 
apparent in the wake of Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, in which the court 
determined that under section 7102’s existing language, an express and 
unambiguous NDFD clause creates an “iron-bound bar against any 
potential liability” on the part of the owners in all private construction 
contracts, including sub-contracts under contracts involving the United 
States.26
The purpose of this Comment is to urge the California legislature to 
revise section 7102 in order to render an NDFD clause void as against 
public policy in every construction contract when delay is caused in 
whole or in part by the acts or omissions of the owner or its agents.  Part 
I of this Comment provides the reader with a brief explanation of how 
construction contracts are formed and describes the nature of liability 
associated with delay in the construction industry.  Part II includes a 
brief overview of the general enforceability of NDFD clauses and 
chronicles the numerous exceptions to their enforcement that have 
evolved through common law and state statutes.  Part III presents policy 
arguments against the enforcement of NDFD clauses and rebuts some 
common arguments posed in favor of their enforcement.  Part IV 
discusses the current treatment of NDFD clauses in California and 
challenges the effectiveness of existing legislation in the wake of 
Harper/Neilson-Dillingham.  Part V presents suggested language for the 
revision of section 7102, modeled on the current Ohio Revised Code 
Annotated, and explains the practical effect of the proposed revisions.  
Finally, this Comment concludes by urging the California legislature to 
revise California Public Contract Code section 7102 to render NDFD 
extension of time for delay for which the contractee is responsible and which delay is unreasonable 
under the circumstances involved, and not within the contemplation of the parties, shall not be 
construed to preclude the recovery of damages by the contractor or subcontractor.  No public agency 
may require the waiver, alteration, or limitation of the applicability of this section.  Any such waiver, 
alteration, or limitation is void.  This section shall not be construed to void any provision in a 
construction contract which requires notice of delays, provides for arbitration or other procedure for 
settlement, or provides for liquidated damages.”). 
25 STEPHEN J. FOWLER, MILLER & STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3D § 27:85 (2010), 
available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:85. 
26 Harper/Neilson-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 678-79 
(2008) (“The court agrees with the government that, . . . California law does not provide exceptions 
to the enforceability of clear and explicit ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in contracts between private 
parties, including, as here, in subcontracts under contracts involving the United States.”). 
5
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clauses unenforceable in all public and private contracts where the 
owners cause delay. 
I. A CONSTRUCTION PRIMER: THE BIDDING PROCESS AND LIABILITY
ASSOCIATED WITH DELAY
Before discussing the significance of NDFD clauses in detail, it will 
be helpful to begin with a brief overview of the general process through 
which construction contracts are obtained and the nature of damages 
stemming from delays. 
A. FORMATION OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
Many private27 and most public construction contracts are awarded 
through a process called competitive bidding.28  The procedure for 
competitive bidding on public projects is determined by state statutes and 
regulations.29  Typically, invitations to bid on a project are published in 
local construction-industry trade papers and include materials such as a 
project description, complete plans, instructions to bidders, bid forms, 
and other contract documents.30  These documents must provide full, 
complete and accurate plans and estimates of cost to the extent necessary 
to allow a competent mechanic or builder to carry them out. 31  On the 
basis of the information contained in the bid documents, contractors are 
asked to submit bids for the total cost of their work.32  The bidding 
process remains open for a specified period of time, after which all of the 
27 See JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA
DOCUMENTS 252 (5th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw SCICA s 9.07 (“Generally, public contracts 
must be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding.  Even most private contracts, with the option 
of bidding or negotiating, are awarded after competitive bidding.  Only experienced owners, who 
must deal with a small number of contractors, perhaps only one, with the technical skill needed, are 
likely to use negotiation.”); see also PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER
AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:22 (2011), available at Westlaw BOCL § 2:22 
(explaining that the process of sealed competitive bidding is mandated almost universally by statute 
in public construction contracts, but is not widely used in private construction contracts; yet, “[e]ven 
where the prime contract is negotiated . . . trade subcontracts frequently are awarded through sealed 
bidding.  Therefore, some form of competitive sealed bidding also continues to be well accepted in 
both international public works and private contracting.”); KENNETH C. GIBBS & GORDON HUNT,
CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW 71 (16th ed. 2000). 
28 JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 7:2 (6th ed. 2004), available 
at Westlaw CACLM § 7:2. 
29 JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND 
DISPUTES § 2.3 (2d ed. 1990). 
30 Id.
31 53 CAL. JUR. 3D, Public Works and Contracts § 36 (2012), available at Westlaw CALJUR 
PUBLICWORK § 36. 
32 Bruner & O’Connor, CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 2:23. 
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bids submitted are reviewed and the contract awarded to the contractor 
providing the most favorable bid.33
In public contracts, competitive bidding is thought to promote the 
public interest by stimulating competition, thereby ensuring a fair price 
and protecting against government favoritism or corruption.34
Accordingly, public-contract statutes commonly require that a contract 
be awarded to the “lowest responsible bidder.”35  Technically, the 
responsibility criterion means that in addition to price, a public entity 
may consider the contractors’ trustworthiness, quality, fitness, capacity 
and experience necessary to successfully complete the project when 
determining which bid to accept.36  In practice, however, rejecting the 
lowest bid as “irresponsible” for any but the most compelling reasons is 
considered highly unethical.37  As a result of this practice, contractors 
commonly expect construction projects to be awarded to the contractor 
offering the lowest bid. 38
Although the competitive bidding process benefits owners by 
placing contractors into free and open competition with one another, it is 
inherently risky for the contractors.39  After all, in order to remain in 
business, a contractor must be the lowest bidder on a certain number of 
projects.40  To be the lowest bidder, a contractor must bid aggressively 
on the basis of information concerning future conditions and factors that 
33 Id.
34 See JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 7:2 (6th ed. 2004), 
available at Westlaw CACLM § 7:2. 
35 Id. (emphasis added); see CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10180 (Westlaw 2011) (requiring that 
in California, state construction contracts be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder where 
competitive bidding is required). 
36 STEPHEN J. FOWLER, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3D § 27:33 (2010), 
available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:33; see PUB. CONT. § 1103. 
37 See Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 434 (2002) 
(“To find out who is the low bidder, sealed bids are often compared to one another on the basis of 
only one factor: price.”); JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES 60 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining that if the bidding process is already 
restricted to a “prequalified” set of contractors, a public agency that selects a contractor other than 
the lowest bidder may face allegations of favoritism or corruption); JOHNATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET 
ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY  CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS 250-51 (2010), available at
Westlaw SCICA s 9.07 (stating that in competitive bidding “[t]he lowest responsible bidder (a 
bidder capable of doing the job) is desired, but an award to anyone but the low bidder can invite a 
lawsuit”); see also Bruner & O’Connor, CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 2:23 (stating that “selection for 
the award may be made on the basis of price alone”). 
38 See Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 434. 
39 See id. at 430. 
40 See id. at 434. 
7
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may be largely unknowable at the time of bidding.41  A successful bidder 
may need to speculate whether there will be a future increase in materials 
costs, anticipate how future events will affect construction and estimate 
the impacts of any details not included in the drawings.42  At the same 
time, contractors are afforded little to no bargaining power over the 
underlying terms of the contract.43  The owner is responsible for creating 
the project specifications and is typically able to determine both the form 
of contract and the extent of risk-sharing between the parties.44  In this 
highly competitive system, any attempt by a contractor to alter the 
material terms of the underlying contract may result in an owner’s 
decision to reject the contractor’s bid and select a more compliant 
contractor from the range of available competitors.45  Thus the 
contractors’ relative lack of bargaining power, coupled with industry 
knowledge that contracts will be awarded to the lowest bidder, gives rise 
to “kamikaze-style” bidding practices and creates a system that rewards 
contractors who undervalue construction costs and associated risks.46
B. LIABILITY ASSOCIATED WITH DELAY DAMAGES
Delay is recognized as “a way of life” in the construction industry 
and is known to be one of the most prevalent and costly risks faced 
during construction projects.47  This is to be expected because the 
41 See id. at 430. 
42 See id.
43 See id. at 434; see also Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction 
Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 482 (1978) (“When a project is advertised, a 
contractor may not generally negotiate with regard to the specific terms of the contract.  He must 
either submit a bid on the contract as offered to the public or simply refrain from bidding.  In this 
situation, it is the owner who generally has the superior bargaining position.”); PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW §2:9.50 (2011), 
available at Westlaw BOCL § 2:9.50 (“Because of wide industry use of the competitive sealed bid 
process of contract formation in the public sector and its mandated contract terms, from which no 
material exception may be taken without risk of rejection of bid as “‘nonresponsive,’” there is 
perhaps less bargaining between owner and contractor over initial contract terms in the construction 
industry than in other areas of commerce.”). 
44 See Bruner & O’Connor, CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 2:9. 
45 See id. § 2:9.50. 
46 See Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 434. 
47 ROBERT A. REUBEN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS: PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 52 
(2d ed. 1992); see ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE 
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC § 16.02 (“By far the most 
commonly and hotly litigated claims of contractors involve delays caused by the owner or by 
persons for whom the owner is responsible.”). 
8
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modern construction process is inherently complex.48  Building projects 
often require the coordination of separate yet interdependent 
performances by numerous parties, and timely completion can be 
affected by factors beyond any one party’s control.49  The ability of 
contractors to recover monetary damages stemming from the delay of 
others is critical, because the scope of such damages would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to anticipate and bargain for at the time of 
contracting.50
There are many situations in which contractors may incur damages 
stemming from owner-caused delays.51  For example, a contractor may 
be delayed due to an owner’s tardy submission of changes to the original 
project specifications, untimely discovery of errors in the plans, failure to 
obtain permits or issue immediate approvals for permitted work, or 
intentional frustration of the contractor’s performance.52  A contractor 
could also experience delay as a result of the owner’s failure to 
coordinate the work of any number of other independent contractors 
under its control.53  When construction projects involve the coordination 
of separate performances by numerous parties, any one delayed 
performance can cause a domino effect of further delays due to the 
inability of other parties to begin performances on the agreed date.54
48 See John W. Hinchey, Visions for the Next Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW 
HANDBOOK 29, 31-33 (Robert F. Cushman ed., 1999) (explaining that a construction project of 
average complexity may involve between five and fifteen firms working on the design process, as 
well as forty to a hundred companies that are engaged in construction and many more companies 
hired to supply materials and services necessary to complete the project); see Bruner & O’Connor, 
CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 1.2. 
49 S. GREGORY JOY ET AL., ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES TO STANDARD CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS 7 (2010), available at Westlaw ACSCC § 1.02 (explaining that ordinary construction 
projects require the participation and risk the financial resources of a large number of parties).  “If 
one falls down, many others may follow.  The chain of risk extends far beyond those who have 
direct contracts with a failing party.”  Id. See RICHARD A. LORD, Conditions Relating to Time of 
Performance, in 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 46:7 (4th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw 
WILLSTN-CN § 46:7. 
50 See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1877 (2005). 
51 See BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 
3.02 (4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL § 3.02; ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL.,
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at
Westlaw CDRTC § 16.02. 
52 Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 3.02; see Douglas S. Oles, “No
Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 474-76 (1978). 
53 Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 3.02; see Oles, “No Damage” 
Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 476. 
54 Andrew D. Ness, Construction Damages, in CONSTRUCTION LAW 255-62 (2001). 
9
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Even delays of short duration can trigger a speedy increase in a 
contractor’s project costs.55  For example, typical contractor delay 
damages include the costs associated with increased labor and 
materials,56 extended job-site and home-office overhead, laying off and 
rehiring work crews, loss of efficiency of work crews who have to work 
around delayed projects, loss of alternative construction job 
opportunities, or items such as rental equipment, utilities, and site 
securities.57  Depending upon the nature and cause of the delay, a 
contractor may be contractually bound to incur such costs for an 
extended period of days, months, or even years beyond that stipulated in 
the original contract.58  Given the numerous possible methods of delay 
resulting from the actions of owners and the exponential nature of 
damages stemming from delays that do occur, a blanket ban on a 
contractor’s ability to recover delay damages represents an “enormous 
and almost unquantifiable risk.”59
Thus, in the absence of an NDFD or alternate exculpatory clause, a 
contractor is usually entitled to recover damages associated with owner-
caused delays, and the contractor will be granted additional time to 
complete its performance when the delay stems from conditions beyond 
55 See JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND 
DISPUTES 272 (2d ed. 1990); see also W.C. James, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 485 F.2d 22, 23 
(10th Cir. 1973) (three-month delay in completion of work on a pipeline construction led to an 
alleged $760,875.43 in delay damages); Tonkin Constr. Co. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 188 Cal. App. 3d 
828, 830, 832 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that county was liable for $27,276.08 in costs incurred by 
contractor when it was required to perform extra work on a seawall it had constructed due to a two-
month delay in services of county’s dredging contractor). 
56 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 
476 (“Although a standard Changes Clause may provide for compensating the contractor for the 
increases in material and labor costs which are directly attributable to the work changed by the 
owner, the contractor is likely to incur significant additional damages due to the impact of such 
changes in holding up other segments of its work which were not directly changed.”). 
57 Eric Berg, No Damages for Delay, in THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS BOOK 117 (2008); 
see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 476-
77. 
58 See, e.g., Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667 
(2008) (upholding application of an NDFD Clause following a 223-day delay); Kent v. United 
States, 228 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (contractor hired to install an approach lighting system at 
J.F.K. International Airport was barred from recovery of an alleged $7,803.40 incurred due to a four-
month delay stemming from the government’s issuance of a notice to proceed); Am. Bridge Co. v. 
State, 283 N.Y.S. 577, 584 (App. Div. 1935) (stating that it was doubtful that an NDFD clause 
would be interpreted to bar recovery of damages stemming from delay of nearly 2 years); Endres 
Plumbing Corp. v. State, 95 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (finding that a six-month delay 
was not so unreasonable as to invalidate an NDFD clause). 
59 Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1877 (2005). 
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either party’s control.60  In practice, however, this general rule represents 
somewhat of an oversimplification, because the ultimate determination 
of liability for delay damages is governed by the agreement between the 
parties.61  “No damage for delay” clauses can be understood in this 
context as a contractual tool used by owners to shift virtually all of the 
risk of construction-project delays to contractors.62  The following Part 
will explore the common-law and statutory treatment of NDFD clauses. 
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF “NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY” CLAUSES
A “no damage for delay” clause exculpates an owner from liability 
for damages suffered by a contractor as a result of project delays, 
including delays caused by or attributable to the owner or its agents.63  In 
the event of delay, an NDFD clause limits a contractor’s remedy to an 
extension of time in which to complete the project.64  Although NDFD 
clauses vary widely in form, a typical example may be worded as 
follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Contract Documents, 
an extension in the Contract Time, to the extent permitted shall be the 
sole remedy of the Contractor for any (i) delay in the commencement, 
prosecution, or completion of the Work, (ii) hindrance or obstruction 
in the performance of the Work, (iii) loss of productivity, or (iv) other 
similar claims (collectively referred to in this Subparagraph as 
“Delays”) whether or not such Delays are foreseeable, within the 
contemplation of the parties, or caused by the acts of the Owner or its 
agents.  In no event shall the Contractor be entitled to any 
60 See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:29 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL § 15:29 (explaining that liability 
for delay is often assessed based upon a determination of which party “controlled” the time-
impacting event, and providing  a general definition of “compensable delay” as “[d]elay caused by 
an event within the control of the owner and beyond the control of the contractor, for which the 
contractor and its affected subcontractors and suppliers are entitled to an extension of contract time 
and damages or an equitable adjustment.”); see also BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN,
CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 1.01 (2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL s 1.01 (providing a 
detailed discussion of the general principles surrounding excusable, inexcusable, compensable and 
non-compensable delays in construction contracts). 
61 ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE 
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 16.02. 
62 Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages 
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 32 (2002). 
63 NDFD clauses have also been incorporated into construction contracts between contractors 
and subcontractors, and they have been held to bind subcontractors in some instances through the 
application of “flow down” provisions incorporated in prime contracts.  Bruner & O’Connor, 
CONSTRUCTION LAW at § 3:32; see Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. 667. 
64 Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16. 
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compensation or recovery of any damages, in connection with any 
Delay, including, without limitation, consequential damages, lost 
opportunity costs, impact damages, or other similar remuneration.65
The consequence of a broadly worded NDFD clause is that a contractor 
must absorb all of its monetary damages associated with delay, even if 
the delay is caused by the actions of the owner or its agents, including 
poor site design, interference with the site, or delayed administration.66
The enforceability of NDFD clauses has been a long-standing topic 
of controversy in the legal field due to their exculpatory nature and 
frequent scholarly recognition of their potential to cause harsh and 
inequitable results.67  The following section discusses the widely varied 
state practices with regard to the enforceability of NDFD clauses.  
Notably, NDFD clauses are not included in three widely used standard-
form construction industry contracts: the American Institute of Architects 
(AIA) construction industry documents, ConsensusDocs, and the 
Engineers Joint Contract Documents Committee.68  Additionally, the 
federal government refrains from including NDFD clauses in its standard 
contracts, citing the express purpose of avoiding the inequities associated 
with barring a contractor’s recovery of damages associated with 
government delay.69
65 Dean B. Thomson, Legislative Update: No Damage for Delay Clauses Barred,
FABYANSKE, WESTRA, HART & THOMSON, P.A. (May 1, 2002), www.fwhtlaw.com/articles/ 
legislative_update_no_damage.cfm. 
66 Gatlin, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW. at 32; Susan Sisskind Dunne, “No Damage for Delay” 
Clauses, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 38 (1999). 
67 See, e.g., Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A 
Proposed Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1857, 1859 (2005); Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique,
53 WASH. L. REV. 471 (1978); Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in 
Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425 
(2002); Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 9 (1986); Cordell Parvin, No Damages/Delay Clauses Fair?, 6 ROADS &
BRIDGES 8 (Oct. 1990); Dunne, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. at 38; see J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia 
Davenport, The ‘No Damage for Delay’ Clause: A Public Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001). 
68 Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16 (explaining that AIA 
construction industry documents do not preclude recovery by either the owner or the contractor); see
Eric Berg, No Damages for Delay, in THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 117 (2008). 
69 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
489; see Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16 (stating that federal 
construction contracts expressly allow for the recovery of delay damages by a contractor under the 
suspension clause). 
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A. COMMON-LAW EXCEPTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT
The enforceability of NDFD clauses depends entirely on state law,70
and in the absence of specific legislation, the varied treatment of NDFD 
clauses at common law has led to difficulties for contractors in 
determining when they will be enforced.71  Courts in most jurisdictions 
regard NDFD clauses as generally valid contractual provisions72 but 
disfavor their enforcement due to their potential to create harsh and 
inequitable results.73  For this reason, courts strictly construe the 
language of NDFD clauses against their drafters.74  Accordingly, courts 
may decline to enforce the most broadly worded forms of NDFD clauses, 
such as those purporting to exculpate owners for delays stemming from 
“any cause,” because the wording of such clauses is too ambiguous.75
In addition to the common-law policy of strict construction, a wide 
range of well-recognized exceptions may bar enforcement on a case-by-
case basis.76  These exceptions vary by jurisdiction, but they generally 
include 1) a delay not covered by the plain language of the clause, 2) a 
type of delay not contemplated by the parties when entering into the 
agreement, 3) a delay of unreasonable duration, 4) a delay resulting from 
the active interference or wrongful conduct by the owner, 5) waiver of 
the clause by the actions of the parties, and 6) fundamental breach by the 
owner justifying non-enforcement of the clause.77  The vast majority of 
state courts that have considered the issue of NDFD clauses78 have 
70 Berg, No Damage for Delay at 117. 
71 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1870; 
see Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With 
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 (1976) (providing an 
overview of common-law exceptions recognized by state). 
72 Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 3. 
73 Id.; see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L.
REV. at 479. 
74 See Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 3. 
75 See id. § 5[a]. 
76 Id. § 7[a] (providing general discussion of commonly recognized judicial exceptions to the 
enforcement of an NDFD clause); see Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” 
Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 425, 446 (2002) (stating that as of 2002, “out of fifty states, forty-eight states either have (1) 
passed laws invalidating the clause, (2) recognized that it is not an absolute bar to recovery or (3) not 
confronted the issue”). 
77 BARRY B. BRAMBLE & MICHAEL T. CALLAHAN, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS § 2.16 
(4th ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CNDCL s 2.16. 
78 As of 2008, courts in Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia had never directly considered the enforceability of 
NDFD clauses. Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction Law 
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recognized at least one of these judicial exceptions to their 
enforcement.79  However, the real-world application of such exceptions 
has been highly inconsistent,80 leading one commentator to conclude, “If 
a court finds enforcing the clause inherently unfair, then it will find an 
exception to apply.”81
For example, while multiple states recognize an exception to the 
NDFD clause for delays that are of “unreasonable duration” and 
therefore not considered to have been within the contemplation of the 
parties,82 the specific length of time that constitutes an “unreasonable” 
delay is subject to court discretion.83  Thus, the Michigan Court of 
Appeal has invalidated an NDFD clause on the grounds that the delay 
suffered was of “unreasonable duration” when the contractor suffered a 
nine-and-half-month delay on a project originally scheduled for 
completion in twenty-four months,84 while the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska has upheld an NDFD clause following a delay of 162 days on a 
contract scheduled for completion in 300 days.85  Likewise, inconsistent 
holdings have resulted from court applications of the “active 
interference” exception, which is applied to bar NDFD clauses when the 
delay is due to an owner’s own interference with the work of the 
contractor.  In applying this exception, a minority of state courts have 
invalidated NDFD clauses when the interference resulted from the 
owner’s negligence,86 while others have required a showing of gross 
negligence or intentional misconduct.87
and Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP (May 2008), 
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf. 
79 Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction 
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 446. 
80 Cordell Parvin, ‘No Damages/Delay’ Clauses Fair?, ROADS AND BRIDGES 8 (Oct. 1990) 
(“Courts have been all over the map in deciding delay cases where there is a ‘No Damages for 
Delay’ provision.”). 
81 Id.
82 See Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16. 
83 Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1866 (2005). 
84 See E.C. Nolan Co. v. State, 227 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975). 
85 See Siefford v. Hous. Auth., 223 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1974). 
86 Steven B. Lesser & Daniel L. Wallach, Risky Business: The “Active Interference” 
Exception to No-Damage-For-Delay Clauses, 23 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 26, 29 (2003); see, e.g.,
Blake Constr. Co. v. C. J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 579 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding active 
interference exception applied where owner had provided defective plans to contractor); 
Commonwealth of Pa., State Highway & Bridge Auth. v. Gen. Asphalt Paving Co., 405 A.2d 1138, 
1141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (holding active interference exception applied where state failed to 
grant time extensions to contractor in a timely manner). 
87 See Bramble & Callahan, CONSTRUCTION DELAY CLAIMS at § 2.16; Lesser & Wallach, 23
CONSTRUCTION LAWYER at 26; see, e.g., Gasparini Excavating Co. v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 187 A.2d 
14
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The practical effect of such numerous and inconsistently applied 
judicial exceptions is to create uncertainty over whether an NDFD clause 
will be enforced by courts; all NDFD clauses walk a thin line between 
validation and invalidation, with courts tending to err in favor of 
invalidation.88  It is therefore difficult for parties to predict the 
consequences of an NDFD clause included within a building contract.89
B. STATUTORY LIMITS ON ENFORCEMENT
In addition to the common-law exceptions, a number of states have 
statutorily limited or barred the enforcement of NDFD clauses.90
Currently, at least twelve states have adopted legislation that limits the 
enforceability of NDFD clauses: Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington.91  Of these, Kentucky,92
157, 162, 164 (Pa. 1963) (holding active interference exception applied where owner had ordered 
contractor to begin work but denying access to the work area that was occupied by another 
contractor); P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 531 A.2d 1330, 1343 (N.J. 1987) 
(holding no active interference exception applied due to owner’s failure to adequately coordinate 
work of subcontractor). 
88 Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 447 (2002). 
89 Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1859-60 (2005). 
90 Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction Law and 
Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP (May 2008), 
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf; 
Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION 
LAW. 9 (1985-1986). 
91 CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-91-103.5 
(Westlaw 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.405(2)(c) (Westlaw 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
Ch. 30, § 390 (Westlaw 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.411 (Westlaw 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
34.058 (Westlaw 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-134.3 (Westlaw 2011), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:58B-3 (Westlaw 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62 (Westlaw 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 
2.2-4335(A) (Westlaw 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 (Westlaw 2011); see Lecusay, 
The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call 
for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 446, 456-64 (providing general synopsis of 
current legislation limiting the enforcement of NDFD clauses by state). 
92 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.405(2)(c) (Westlaw 2011) (declaring provisions in 
construction contracts void as against public policy if they purport to “waive, release, or extinguish 
the right of a contractor or subcontractor to recover costs, additional time, or damages, or obtain an 
equitable adjustment of the contract, for delays in performing the contract that are, in whole or part, 
within the control of the contracting entity. Unusually bad weather that cannot be reasonably 
anticipated, fire, or other act of God shall not automatically entitle the contractor to additional 
compensation under this paragraph.”). 
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Ohio,93 and Washington94 have enacted the most expansive statutes, in 
that they render NDFD clauses per se unenforceable in public and private 
contracts under certain conditions.95  In fact, the number of states that 
have chosen to enact formal legislation limiting the enforceability of 
NDFD clauses has more than quadrupled since California first enacted its 
Public Contract Code section 7102 in 1985. 96  Indeed, it appears that 
“[l]egislation against the NDFD clause is in; passing the buck is not.”97
Perhaps this trend evidences a growth in state recognition that such 
clauses represent a public policy concern.98
93 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62(C) (Westlaw 2011) (“(1)  Any provision of a 
construction contract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is 
made a part of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes 
liability for delay during the course of a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a 
proximate result of the owner’s act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for a 
construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner’s act or failure 
to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.  (2)  Any provision of a construction 
subcontract, agreement, or understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made part 
of a construction subcontract, agreement, or understanding, that waives or precludes liability for 
delay during the course of a construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate 
result of the owner’s or contractor’s act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for a 
construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result of the owner’s or 
contractor’s act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.”). 
94 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 (Westlaw 2011) (“Any clause in a construction 
contract, as defined in RCW 4.24.370, which purports to waive, release, or extinguish the rights of a 
contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to damages or an equitable adjustment arising out of 
unreasonable delay in performance which delay is caused by the acts or omissions of the contractee 
or persons acting for the contractee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.  This 
section shall not be construed to void any provision in a construction contract, as defined in RCW 
4.24.370, which (1) requires notice of delays, (2) provides for arbitration or other procedure for 
settlement, or (3) provides for reasonable liquidated damages.”). 
95 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62 (Westlaw 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 
(Westlaw 2011). 
96 See ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE 
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 16.02 (stating that Colorado, 
California, Massachusetts, and Washington were the first states to enact statutes addressing NDFD 
clauses); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.405(c) (Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 2007); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 15.411 (Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.62 
(Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4335(A) (Westlaw 2011) (enacted in 
2001). 
97 Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 446 (2002); see 
also Cushman, CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR at 496 (“[T]he recent 
surge of activity in state legislatures in an effort to restrict or preclude enforcement of the ‘no 
damage for delay’ clauses in public construction contracts indicates that the pendulum is starting to 
swing back and treat the construction industry with more fairness.”). 
98 Other states have recently attempted to pass legislation limiting the enforceability of 
NDFD clauses as well. Notably, the New York Legislature passed a bill limiting the enforceability 
of NDFD clauses in 1998.  However, the bill was ultimately vetoed by the governor, despite his 
express agreement with the central purpose and intent of the bill.  Contractors renewed their efforts.  
Henry L. Goldbert, Albany Eyes Damages for Delay in Public Works, LAW/COURTROOM NEWS
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III. POLICY ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF “NO
DAMAGE FOR DELAY” CLAUSES
The enforceability of NDFD clauses has been a subject of 
longstanding debate.  This Part reviews a number of core arguments and 
policy concerns advanced by both sides of the controversy and concludes 
that NDFD clauses should not be enforced because of their 1) potential to 
result in harsh and inequitable consequences that are disfavored by 
common law, 2) inherent inefficiency as tools for apportioning the risks 
of delay in construction contracts, and 3) potential unconscionability. 
A. FREEDOM TO CONTRACT
Proponents of NDFD clauses commonly rely upon the policy of 
freedom to contract, a principle long idealized in American 
jurisprudence.99  This argument is based on the premise that at the time 
of contracting, both parties are aware of risks associated with delay in 
construction contracts and should be allowed to bargain between 
themselves to apportion these risks in a manner that they deem most 
beneficial.100  Proponents assert that contractors are sophisticated 
business parties who can bargain during the bidding process for the 
inclusion of other favorable terms or a higher rate for their services as 
required to adequately shield themselves from the risks associated with 
NDFD clauses.101  However, “freedom to contract” is not an absolute 
concept and is often limited through legislative and judicial restrictions 
applied to protect public interests.102  Opponents have effectively 
(July 2006), http://newyork.construction.com/opinions/law/archive/2006/07.asp; see Cushman, 
CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR at 496 (stating that the 1998 NY bill 
provided compensation for excusable delay which was defined as “(1) the cause of the delay arises 
after award of the public contract and was caused by the public owner’s acts or omissions and/or is 
attributable to changed conditions or differing site or subsurface conditions; (2) the contractor, 
subcontractor, or materialman demonstrates that completion of the work or delivery of material will 
be actually and necessarily delayed; (3) the effect of such cause cannot be avoided or mitigated by 
the exercise of all reasonable precautions efforts and measures whether before or after the 
occurrence of the cause of the delay; and (4) the contractor, subcontractor or materialman properly 
submits notice to the public owner in accordance with the provisions of the public contract.”). 
99 Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1870 (2005). 
100 See id. at 1870-73. 
101 See id.
102 8 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 1070 (10th ed. 2005), 
available at Westlaw 8 WITSUM Ch. X, § 1070 (stating that while some older cases have asserted 
that freedom to contract is the rule, and restrain the exception, this position has been abandoned; this 
is especially true in contracts regarding terms of employer-employee relations); see 16A C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 721 (2011) (“Liberty to contract is not an absolute right, but is qualified and 
17
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attacked the “freedom to contract” argument on the basis that enforcing 
NDFD clauses, especially in instances of owner-caused delay, is contrary 
to public policy interests.103
Opponents urge that the “freedom to contract” argument is overly 
simplistic when applied to NDFD clauses because it assumes a system in 
which both parties possess equal power to bargain for the terms most 
favorable to them.  Proponents suggest that a contractor can protect itself 
from the risk of delay by increasing its bid for the project to account for 
the possibility of future delays.104  This may not be the case with regard 
to NDFD clauses in construction contracts.  Rather, the bargaining power 
of contractors with regard to an NDFD clause may be severely eroded by 
both the competitive bidding process105 and the inherent difficulty of 
predicting the significance of such clauses at the time of contracting.106
As discussed previously, most public and many private construction 
projects are secured through competitive bidding.107  In this system, 
limited by the legitimate supervision of the government.  The right is subject to regulations or 
restrictions that are reasonable in light of the purposes to be accomplished.  Liberty of contract may 
be limited, restrained, and circumscribed in order to protect an overriding public interest.”). 
103 J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public 
Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 12 (Oct. 2001) (“It is the policy of the law, generally, to furnish everyone 
with legal remedies for any injuries received.  Accordingly, a no damage for delay clause which on 
its face imposes a penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default, 
is contrary to public policy.”); Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in 
Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 
456 (2002) (“Is the public really interested in allowing—as a matter of policy—one party to ‘sell’ to 
another responsibility for delay caused by the same party just because there should be freedom to 
contract, where the ‘buying’ party must either take the contract or leave it, and close its doors?”); see 
Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV.
471, 497 (1978) (“Because ‘no damage’ clauses are either unnecessary to bar a contractor’s recovery 
when delays are foreseeable, or impose an unreasonable burden on a contractor when delays are 
unforeseeable, equity would best be served by denying them any operative effect.”). 
104 Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages 
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32 (2002). 
105 See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L.
REV. at 482; Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 432-36. 
106 See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1877-78 (2005). 
107 See PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:22 (2011), available at Westlaw BOCL § 2:22 (explaining that the process 
of sealed competitive bidding is mandated almost universally by statute in public construction 
contracts, but is not widely used in private construction contracts.  Yet, “[e]ven where the prime 
contract is negotiated . . . trade subcontracts frequently are awarded through sealed bidding.  
Therefore, some form of competitive sealed bidding also continues to be well accepted in both 
international public works and private contracting.”); JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS 252 (2009), available at Westlaw 
SCICA s 9.07 (“Generally, public contracts must be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding.  
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owners typically occupy a much stronger bargaining position than the 
contractors, who are under pressure to place low bids in order to secure 
projects.108  In fact, a competitive bidding process may leave contractors 
with no meaningful opportunity to bargain for alternate terms.109  As one 
commentator observed: 
[A] contractor may not generally negotiate with regard to the specific 
terms of the contract.  He must either submit a bid on the contract as 
offered to the public or simply refrain from bidding. . . . Of course, it 
might be argued that a contractor can always go elsewhere and bid on 
work which is advertised with more favorable contract terms, but 
where exculpatory provisions such as “no damage” clauses are 
commonly in use and held valid, it may become difficult to obtain 
sufficient contract work not imposing such conditions.110
A number of commentators have recognized the weak bargaining 
position of contractors involved in statutorily mandated sealed 
competitive bidding processes.111  A contractor that includes a 
contingency for delay damages associated with the NDFD clause in its 
bid may not receive the job if other contractors elect to bid without a 
contingency.112  The competitive bidding process thus undermines the 
central premise of the “freedom to contract” argument: that the parties 
will be able to effectively bargain between themselves for the most 
favorable terms. 
Even most private contracts, with the option of bidding or negotiating, are awarded after competitive 
bidding.  Only experienced owners, who must deal with a small number of contractors, perhaps only 
one, with the technical skill needed, are likely to use negotiation.”); KENNETH C. GIBBS & GORDON 
HUNT, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW 71 (16th ed. 2000). 
108 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872. 
109 See id.
110 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 
482. 
111 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872 (“In reality, 
owners occupy a much stronger bargaining position than the contractors who work for them.  In 
many cases the bidding contractors have no choice but to accept no damages for delay clauses and 
other owner-friendly contract provisions if they wish to participate in the work.”); Cheri Turnage 
Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial Enforcement 
of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32 (2002) (“Recognizing that contractors cannot 
practically protect themselves with contingency bidding, courts strictly construe no-damage-for-
delay clauses and give only restrained approval.”); see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction 
Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 482; Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for 
Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 425, 432-36 (2002). 
112 Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial 
Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32. 
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Furthermore, a contractor’s ability to effectively bargain concerning 
the inclusion of NDFD clauses is undermined by the enormous difficulty 
of predicting both the enforceability of such clauses and estimating their 
potential future impacts if they are enforced.113  As discussed previously, 
the statutory limitations on the enforcement of NDFD clauses, 
considered in tandem with the myriad state-specific judicial exceptions, 
render the ultimate enforceability of an NDFD anything but certain.114
As Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham illustrates, a contractor’s inability to 
accurately predict at the time of contracting whether an NDFD clause 
will be enforced can have steep financial consequences.115
Additionally, the “freedom to contract” argument assumes that a 
contractor is able to weigh the risk of project delays and respond by 
bargaining for a sufficient contingency amount in the initial project 
estimates.116  Yet the enormity of liability associated with any and all 
potential project delays, including those caused by an owner or its agents 
and thus outside of the contractor’s control, may be beyond 
calculation.117  In reality, “the risk of delay is an enormous issue in 
construction, and the proof and calculation of delay damages can be 
extraordinarily challenging, even after a delay has occurred. . . . [A] 
blanket ban on recovery under a no damages for delay clause is an 
enormous and almost unquantifiable risk.”118  Even if contractors were 
113 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1884; 
cf. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 487 
(“[E]nforcement of a ‘no damage’ clause may have the oppressive effect of forcing a contractor to 
gamble on the quality of the owner’s specifications, the owner’s promptness in contract 
administration, and the owner’s moderation in exercising authority under the Changes Clause, since 
delay damages arising from the owner’s failures in these areas may be held nonrecoverable.”). 
114 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1870 
(“The question of whether any given no damages for delay clause is judicially enforceable is 
ultimately a very difficult one. . . . In most states, however, confusion continues to be the rule and 
certainty the exception.”). 
115 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2008) 
(noting that KCI’s general manager who signed the subcontract later testified that KCI had believed 
the NDFD clause to be “a boilerplate phrase that’s contained in most contracts that’s generally 
ignored because it’s not enforceable”). 
116 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872. 
117 See id. at 1884; Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages 
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 32. 
118 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause,  46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1877; see also
Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction 
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 468 (2002) (“Proponents 
claim that the clause affords an opportunity to know upfront what the costs of delays will be in order 
20
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able to accurately predict the future enforcement of NDFD clauses, it 
remains unlikely that they could effectively bargain to protect themselves 
from the liability associated with owner-caused delays.119  The inability 
of contractors to bargain effectively to protect themselves against the far-
reaching financial risks associated with NDFD clauses thus undermines 
proponents’ “freedom to contract” argument. 
B. FAIRNESS
The fairness of enforcing NDFD clauses has been a subject of 
heated debate.120  Proponents argue that NDFD clauses are valuable tools 
for protecting an owner’s ability to accurately project costs at the time of 
contracting.121  Proponents also suggest that NDFD clauses prevent 
contractors from making vexatious claims that result in costly litigation, 
compromising the economics and administration of the project.122  The 
policy goals underlying this argument are the strongest in the context of a 
public works contract, given the public interest in protecting public tax 
dollars against “vexatious litigation based on claims, real or fancied, that 
the agency has been responsible for unreasonable delays.”123  However, 
when private parties enter agreements involving NDFD clauses, there is 
less public interest to protect through limiting litigation.124  Additionally, 
proponents suggest that the use of NDFD clauses discourages contractors 
from causing project delays due to the knowledge that they will not be 
able to seek monetary compensation.125
In contrast, opponents of NDFD clauses have strongly criticized the 
provisions as unfair “draconian” tools that result in harsh 
to better manage limited public funds.  But this is a mirage.  It is improbable, if not impossible, to 
accurately forecast delay events to any degree of mathematical certainty.”). 
119 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1877. 
120 See id. at 1859 (“No damages for delay clauses in construction contracts have always been 
very controversial.”); see Cordell Parvin, No Damages/Delay Clauses Fair?, ROADS & BRIDGES 8
(Oct. 1990). But see David P. Gontar, The Enforceability of “No Damages for Delay” Clauses in 
Construction Contracts, 28 LOY. L. REV. 129 (1982). 
121 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause,  46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1871. 
122 Id.; J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A 
Public Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001). 
123 Gontar, The Enforceability of “No Damages for Delay” Clauses in Construction 
Contracts, 28 LOY. L. REV. at 130 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
124 Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH.
L. REV. 471, 488 n.70 (1978). 
125 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1871. 
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consequences.126  The significance of uncompensated damages incurred 
by a contractor due to the enforcement of an NDFD clause was 
previously noted with regard to the California case of Harper/Nielsen-
Dillingham.127  In addition, literature analyzing the application of NDFD 
clauses is abundant with cases illustrating the potentially devastating 
consequences of NDFD clauses.128  For example, the enforcement of an 
NDFD clause barred a New York contractor from seeking an estimated 
$3,311,960 in damages that it had incurred over a twenty-eight-month 
delay allegedly caused by the City’s “endless” revision of plans and 
failure to coordinate activities of prime contractors.129  Similarly, an 
NDFD clause has been applied to bar a Texas contractor from recovering 
an estimated $5,108,765.50 in damages that it had incurred due to an 
approximately two-year delay that allegedly resulted from the City’s 
issuance of several hundred changes to the original plans.130
In addition to the potentially harsh results induced by NDFD 
clauses, several commentators have called attention to the unfairness of 
broadly worded NDFD clauses that exonerate owners from all liability 
associated with negligent or even willful actions, while providing no 
remedy for contractors even if they have clearly been wronged.131  The 
enforcement of such clauses is contrary to the well-recognized public 
policy that courts should not interpret a contract so as to put one party at 
the mercy of another’s negligence.132  Although owners have a valid 
interest in protecting themselves from project delays and vexatious 
litigation, “to suppose for the moment that owners themselves can be 
126 Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 427 (2002); see
Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With Respect 
to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 3 (1976) (“[B]ecause of the harsh 
results often induced by the ‘no damage for delay’ clause, such clause is given strict 
construction . . . .”). 
127 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667, 669 (2008) 
(finding an NDFD clause barred subcontractor from asserting  a claim against the federal 
government for estimated delay damages of $770,565.00, an amount greater than the original 
contract price). 
128 See, e.g., Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 (providing analysis of multi-jurisdictional NDFD case 
precedent); Richard Gary Thomas & Fred D. Wilshusen, How to Beat a ‘No Damage for Delay’ 
Clause, 9 CONSTRUCTION LAW 17, 22 (1989). 
129 Kalish-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 448 N.E.2d 413, 414-15 (N.Y. 1983). 
130 City of Houston v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 14th Dist. 
1978). 
131 Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction 
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 441. 
132 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 284 (2011); see Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in 
Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 481 (1978). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss2/6
2012] “No Damage For Delay” Clauses 305 
                                                          
excused for delays occasioned by their own behavior entirely misses the 
mark on the purpose for the clause.”133
Finally, NDFD clauses are unfair in application.134  They are 
typically one-sided instruments that bar contractors from collecting 
monetary damages stemming from delay attributable to others, while 
placing no similar limitation on owners.135  The contractor’s only remedy 
is an extension of the time for performance, which is “wholly inadequate 
because it fails to recognize that any delay will render the contractor’s 
performance more expensive.”136  Although a standard Changes Clause 
provides for compensating the contractor for additional material and 
labor costs that are directly attributable to changes in the work, a delayed 
contractor will likely be forced to absorb a range of uncompensated costs 
while waiting to complete the project.137  For example, a delayed 
contractor may need to pay additional money to retain its workforce 
during the delay period or may incur damages as a result of lost 
alternative opportunities for employment.138
The unjust results of enforcing NDFD clauses are particularly 
apparent in contracts that also contain liquidated damages clauses, which 
protect owners from damages associated with the delay of contractors.139
A liquidated damages clause requires the contractor to pay the owner a 
133 J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public 
Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 8 (Oct. 2001). 
134 Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction 
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 442 (noting that NDFD clauses 
have been applied to bar contractors from obtaining damages even when the associated delay was 
due to deliberate owner interference.); Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A 
Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 497 (“The operative effect of a ‘no damage’ clause is to bar a 
contractor from recovering impact damages arising from unforeseeable delays which are attributable 
to the owner.  When it is so enforced, the clause works the oppressive effect of subjecting a 
contractor to broad and uncertain liability for which it cannot adequately provide in its bid.”); 
Grandoff & Davenport, FLA. B. J. at 12 ( “A no damage for delay clause which on its face imposes a 
penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default, is contrary to 
public policy.”). 
135 Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction 
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 441. 
136 Robert A. Rubin, Summaries of Debate at the April 28 Fourth Annual Meeting of the ABA 
Forum Committee on the Construction Industry Held at Tampa, Florida, 8 CONSTRUCTION LAW 41 
(1988) (summarizing Robert A. Rubin’s presentation: “No Damage for Delay”—Fair or Foul? The 
Contractor’s Perspective).
137 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
476-77. 
138 Id.
139 See Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 437-40; see Oles, 
“No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 491; Carl S. 
Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative to the 
Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 1873 (2005). 
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fixed amount of money per day for each day a project is delayed.140
Although liquidated damages clauses have a similar purpose to NDFD 
clauses, a liquidated damages clause will not be enforced by courts if it is 
determined to be unreasonable at the time of contracting.141  By contrast, 
NDFD clauses—which relieve owners of all liability for damages 
associated with their own delays—have been enforced by courts 
regardless of their reasonableness.142  As commentator Alain Lecusay 
explained in his 2002 article on NDFD clauses in Florida: 
When a contractor delays a project, the owner collects damages from 
the guilty contractor by invoking the “Liquidated Damages” clause 
(“LDC”).  The LDC seeks to compensate an owner who cannot make 
beneficial use of the project because the contractor has not completed 
the work.  When an owner delays a project, however, the guilty owner 
does not have to pay the contractor.  The owner, instead, raises a 
shield and says to the contractor, “I don’t have to pay you even if I 
delayed this job.”143
A construction contract containing both an NDFD and liquidated 
damages clause is unfair in that it creates a legal double standard; a 
contractor remains liable for damages associated with its own delays, 
while the owner is not.144  An NDFD clause operates in a similar manner 
to a liquidated damages provision, but it is not governed by any of the 
same reasonableness restrictions that apply to liquidated damages 
provisions as a matter of law.145  The inherent unfairness present in such 
situations, coupled with the high risk of forfeiture associated with NDFD 
clauses, should lead legislators to render NDFD clauses void as against 
public policy in all construction contracts when the owner causes delay. 
140 RICHARD A. HOLDERNESS, HANDLING DISPUTES DURING CONSTRUCTION: HERE’S HOW
AND WHEN TO DO IT 51 (2006). 
141 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at
491. 
142 See Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause 
With Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 7[a] (1976) (“So 
long as the basic requirements for a valid contract are met, the ‘no damage’ clause is binding and 
generally will be enforced according to its terms. . . .”). But see Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in 
Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 492 (arguing that “a ‘no damage’ provision 
in a construction contract is analogous to a liquidated damage provision.  As a result, the former 
ought to be invalidated whenever it fails to meet the test of ‘reasonable forecast of just 
compensation . . . breach’ which limits the enforcement of [liquidated damage provisions].”). 
143 Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction 
Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 437. 
144 See id. at 437-38. 
145 See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 15 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. at 437-40. 
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C. UNCONSCIONABILITY
In addition to general policy concerns over the fairness of NDFD 
clauses, opponents of NDFD clauses have argued that they may operate 
as unconscionable provisions.146  It is a well-established principle of 
common law that courts may refuse to enforce a contractual provision 
that is unconscionable due to “an absence of meaningful choice on the 
part of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”147  In California, this doctrine has been 
codified in California Civil Code section 1670.5.148  In order for a 
contractual provision to be deemed unconscionable, courts require a 
showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.149
Procedural unconscionability is evident when the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of a contract involve “an absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties.”150  Substantive 
unconscionability is present where the contract terms are “unreasonably 
favorable” to one party.151  Furthermore, a showing of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same extent in 
146 Id. at 480 (arguing that “when the effect of a ‘no damage’ clause is to impose such an 
unreasonable liability on the contractor as to be oppressive, a court might . . . invoke the rule against 
unconscionability” as a means of attacking their enforcement.); Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the 
Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative the Inadequate “No Damages for 
Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 1873 (2005) (“[S]ome argue that it is 
unconscionable for owners and general contractors to exculpate themselves ahead of time for the 
costs of delays they cause contractors.”). 
147 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV at
481 n.44 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
148 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (Westlaw 2011) (providing that “[i]f the court as a matter of 
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was 
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as 
to avoid any unconscionable result.”). 
149 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 15 (2012),  available at Westlaw CALJUR CONTRACTS § 
15. 
150 Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”); see also 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 16 (“For purposes 
of determining whether a contract provision is unconscionable, the procedural element of the 
unconscionability analysis concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the 
circumstances of the parties at that time; the element focuses on oppression or surprise.  Oppression 
arises from the inequality of bargaining power that results in no real negotiation and an absence of 
meaningful choice.” (footnotes omitted)). 
151 Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; see also 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts § 17 (“Substantively 
unconscionable terms may take various forms, but may generally be described as unfairly one-sided.  
Substantive unconscionability focuses on the terms of the parties’ agreement and whether those 
terms are overly harsh, or are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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order for a court to invalidate a contractual provision.152  California 
courts apply a sliding-scale analysis in that “[t]he more substantively 
oppressive the contract term the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability is required to support the conclusion that the term is 
unenforceable, and vice versa.”153
On a procedural level, scholars have observed that owners typically 
occupy a stronger bargaining position than contractors,154 which 
undermines the ability of contractors to meaningfully negotiate over 
unfavorable terms.155  In contrast, proponents of NDFD clauses have 
asserted that procedural unconscionability arguments are not applicable 
to most construction contracts because of the sophisticated and business-
savvy nature of professional contractors.156  However, scholars have 
noted that the opportunity for meaningful bargaining in both private and 
public construction contracts has been significantly eroded in recent 
years by the prevalent use of form contracts and the emergence of strong 
economic forces that are more readily capable of dictating contractual 
terms to smaller independent contractors and subcontractors.157
Furthermore, even the significant commercial knowledge and experience 
of most contractors would likely fail to even the scales of power in the 
negotiation of many public and private construction contracts, due to the 
inherent “absence of meaningful choice” in the competitive bidding 
process previously discussed.158  Thus, contractors in many public and 
152 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts at § 15. 
153 Id.
154 See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1872 (2005); see also Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A 
Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 482 (1978); JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS 12 (2011), available at Westlaw SCICA § 1.06 
(stating that AIA construction industry documents generally assume that “the owner has greater 
bargaining power than the prime contractor, and that the prime contractor has greater power than 
subcontractors”).
155 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1872 
(“In many cases the bidding contractors have no choice but to accept no damages for delay clauses 
and other owner-friendly contract provisions if they wish to participate in the work.”). 
156 David P. Gontar, The Enforceability of “No Damage for Delay” Clauses in Construction 
Contracts, 28 LOY. L. REV. 129, 140 (1982). 
157 See JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 20 (1970) (“[F]reedom of contract assumes two parties of relatively equal 
bargaining power who jointly negotiate an agreement.  Through the development of mass produced 
contracts and the emergence of large blocs of economic power, this earlier model of the negotiated 
contract has become the exception.”). 
158 Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 
482-83. 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss2/6
2012] “No Damage For Delay” Clauses 309 
                                                          
private contracts may have a strong argument for procedural 
unconscionability. 
On a substantive level, a strong argument exists that NDFD clauses 
unreasonably favor the contractual interests of owners over those of 
contractors.  First, NDFD clauses are inherently one-sided instruments 
that bar contractors from recovering in the event of owner-caused delay 
but provide no reciprocal bar upon the owners’ ability to seek damages in 
the event of contractor-caused delay.159  The one-sided nature of NDFD 
clauses is relevant because courts have considered lack of mutuality in 
contractual terms as a basis for determining substantive 
unconscionability.160
Second, broadly worded NDFD clauses unreasonably favor the 
interests of owners over those of contractors, by requiring contractors to 
absorb substantial uncompensated delay damages, even when such delay 
is the result of an owner’s negligent or unreasonable acts.161  In addition, 
NDFD clauses are inherently unreasonable by virtue of the fact that they 
offer no real consideration to contractors in exchange for their waiver of 
remedies, and instead place them in a position of “bargaining” for rights 
they already possess.162  Proponents of NDFD clauses argue that they 
evidence a meaningful bargain between the parties because the 
contractor is forgoing its right to recover damages in exchange for a right 
to a time extension equal to the length of the delay.163  However, this 
argument ignores the “generally accepted principle of law that a party 
delaying the performance of a contract may not, even in the absence of 
an express term granting time extension, charge the contractor with the 
time damages for consequent delay.”164  In effect, NDFD clauses force 
contractors to abandon their general right to recover damages caused by 
the delay of others, while providing no value in return. 
In summary, NDFD clauses have strong potential to operate as 
unconscionable provisions because they are unreasonably favorable to 
159 Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 441 (2002) 
(“But for a rare occasion, the NDFD clause does not apply to damages that an owner may incur from 
delays caused by a contractor.”). 
160 See 14 CAL. JUR. 3D. Contracts §17 (2012), available at Westlaw CALJUR CONTRACTS 
§ 17. 
161 See Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 15 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. at 441. 
162 Id. at 482-83. 
163 Id. at 482. 
164 Id. at 483. 
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owners165 and are commonly forced upon contractors through a 
competitive bidding process in which they have no meaningful 
opportunity to bargain.166
D. RISK APPORTIONMENT
Regardless of their potential inequities, NDFD clauses should not be 
enforced because they do not fulfill their intended function of efficiently 
apportioning the risks associated with delay in construction contracts.167
As previously noted, it is nearly impossible for a contractor to anticipate 
and accurately calculate monetary losses associated with a virtually 
infinite list of potential project delays, especially those caused by 
others.168  The modern construction process is inherently complex, and 
delay could stem from the failure of any party involved in the project to 
perform by the agreed-upon time.169  Thus, the vast majority of costs 
associated with delays, especially those stemming from the actions of 
parties other than the contractor, are not within the contemplation of the 
contractor at the time of contracting.  As one scholar noted: 
[T]he risk of delay is an enormous issue in construction, and the proof 
and calculation of delay damages can be extraordinarily challenging, 
even after a delay has occurred.  Because delay claims can potentially 
have huge economic impacts on owners and contractors alike, a 
blanket ban on recovery under a no damages for delay clause is an 
enormous and almost unquantifiable risk.170
It is therefore unreasonable to expect contractors to adequately protect 
themselves from the risk of forfeiture associated with such losses by 
165 See Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 441 (2002). 
166 See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1872 (2005); Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages 
and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW 32 (2002); see Oles, “No 
Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. at 482; Lecusay, The 
Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for 
Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. at 432-36. 
167 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1884. 
168 Id. at 1877. 
169 S. GREGORY JOY, EUGENE J. HEADY & JAMES E. STEPHENSON, ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES 
TO STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 7 (2010), available at Westlaw ACSCC s 1.02. 
170 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1877. 
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bargaining for an increased fee at the time of contracting; inequitable 
outcomes of such a practice are inevitable.171
Even if a contractor were in a position to effectively bargain at the 
inception of a project regarding potential delay damages, it would likely 
be unable to appreciate the significance of an NDFD clause due to the 
uncertainty of its enforcement.172  As noted above, because NDFD 
clauses are exculpatory in nature, the majority of courts strictly construe 
them against their drafters.173  Some states have limited or prohibited the 
enforcement of NDFD clauses by statute.174  In states where NDFD 
provisions are not per se unenforceable, several widely recognized 
judicial exceptions make the outcome of litigation uncertain.175
Therefore, contractors cannot be expected to accurately anticipate the 
enforceability of NDFD clauses and to weigh their value accordingly in 
the bargaining process. 
Fortunately, there is little need for states to continue enforcing 
NDFD clauses, given the availability of other widely accepted practices 
that can be used by parties to apportion delay risks and that do not result 
in total forfeiture.  For example, a method similar to the liquidated 
damages clause could also be used by contractors as against owner-
caused delays.176  Effectively crafted liquidated damages clauses would 
give the parties a clear means of predicting their potential liabilities at the 
time of contracting and would simplify any future litigation.177  A 
liquidated damages clause could be structured to include a cap on the 
total amount of delay damages recoverable.178  This method would have 
many of the advantages of a standard liquidated damages clause, while 
providing additional protection for owners by allowing them to 
171 See id. at 1877-78. 
172 See id. at 1870. 
173 Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With 
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 3 (1976). 
174 Construction Law Committee Compendium of Frequently Asked Construction Law and 
Professional Liability Related Questions, THE HARMONIE GROUP (May 2008), 
www.harmonie.org/user_documents/COMPENDIUM%20FINAL%20WITH%20COVER.pdf; 
Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION 
LAW 9 (1985-1986). 
175 Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 7[a]. 
176 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1879; see Cheri 
Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial 
Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW 32, 36 (2002). 
177 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1879-81. 
178 Id. at 1880-81. 
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determine their maximum liability for delay at the start of the project.179
Because such modified liquidated damages clauses do not cause total 
forfeiture, they have been subject to less judicial scrutiny than NDFD 
clauses and are commonly enforced by courts.180
Alternately, owners could place corridor provisions in their 
contracts, 181 which function in essentially the opposite manner as a 
liquidated damages clause with a cap.182  A corridor provision allows the 
contractor to recover for delay damages, but only for delays beyond a 
specified period.183  Put simply, the contractor would not be able to 
recover delay damages until the delay had reached a certain number of 
days.184  For example, a corridor provision may be drafted that entitles a 
contractor to compensation for any delays in excess of thirty days, but no 
compensation for shorter delays.  This type of clause would function to 
protect a contractor in the event of significant delays, while still 
providing incentive to the contractor to avoid short-term delays for which 
it could not recover.185  Given such viable alternative techniques for 
apportioning delay risks in construction contracts, it appears that the 
elimination of the unfair and inefficient NDFD clause would not 
significantly affect the parties’ freedom to contract. 
IV. CALIFORNIA’S TREATMENT OF “NO DAMAGE FOR DELAY”
CLAUSES
Effective January 1, 1985, the California legislature enacted 
California Public Contract Code section 7102, rendering an NDFD 
clause unenforceable in a public works contract when the delay is the 
fault of the owner, unreasonable under the circumstances involved, and 
179 Id.
180 5 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 15:81 (2010), available at Westlaw 
BOCL § 15:81. 
181 These clauses have also been referred to as “elimination periods.”  Beattie, Apportioning 
the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages 
for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1881. 
182 Id.; see Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay 
Damages and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW 32, 36 (2002). 
183 See Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to Recover Delay Damages and Judicial 
Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW at 36. 
184 Id. (observing that a typical elimination clause may read, “The contractor shall be entitled 
to compensation for any delays in excess of 45 days caused by the Owner, Architect, Construction 
Manager, by the employee of any of them, by a separate contractor employed by the Owner, by 
changes in the work.”). 
185 Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed Alternative 
to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1881. 
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not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.186
Under these circumstances, section 7102 authorizes a contractor to 
recover monetary damages associated with delay in spite of the presence 
of an NDFD clause in a public agency’s prime contract and 
subcontracts.187  The statute has no effect on the validity of provisions in 
California construction contracts that require notice of delay or provide 
for liquidated damages for delay.188  Rather, California courts allow 
liquidated damages provisions in construction contracts189 and even 
require them in certain public works contracts.190  Section 7102 was 
enacted to bring the California Public Contract Code in line with 
common-law treatment of NDFD clauses, under which “California 
construction lawyers have long felt that a ‘no damage for delay’ clause 
would not be enforced where unreasonable delays have been caused by 
the project owner.”191
In addition to the statutory limitations contained within section 
7102, California courts have also recognized several judicial exceptions 
to the enforceability of NDFD clauses.192  These exceptions include 
where the contractor’s claim is the result of 1) unreasonable delay,193 2) a 
type of delay that was not contemplated by the parties,194 or 3) an 
186 CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011) (“Contract provisions in construction 
contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder which limit the contractee’s liability to an 
extension of time for delay for which the contractee is responsible and which delay is unreasonable 
under the circumstances involved, and not within the contemplation of the parties, shall not be 
construed to preclude the recovery of damages by the contractor or subcontractor.  No public agency 
may require the waiver, alteration, or limitation of the applicability of this section. Any such waiver, 
alteration, or limitation is void.  This section shall not be construed to void any provision in a 
construction contract which requires notice of delays, provides for arbitration or other procedure for 
settlement, or provides for liquidated damages.”). 
187 JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND 
DISPUTES 277 (2d ed. 1990); see JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL § 7:90 
(6th ed. 2004), available at Westlaw CACLM § 7:90 (noting that statute has no effect on the validity 
of provisions in California construction contracts that require notice of delay or provide for 
liquidated damages for delay). 
188 See Acret, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL at § 7.90. 
189 Acret, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE at 224. 
190 See PUB. CONT. §§ 10105, 10226 (requiring the inclusion of liquidated damages clauses 
for the contractor’s delay in every construction contract whose cost exceeds $250,000); see RICHARD 
A. HOLDERNESS, HANDLING DISPUTES DURING CONSTRUCTION: HERE’S HOW AND WHEN TO DO IT
51 (2006). 
191 Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW 9, 10 (1985-1986). 
192 Maurice T. Brunner, Annotation, Validity and Construction of “No Damage” Clause With 
Respect to Delay in Building or Construction Contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 § 7[a] (1976). 
193 See Hawley v. Orange Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 27 Cal. Rptr. 478, 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1963); Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 7[i]. 
194 Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 187, 190 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Hawley,
27 Cal. Rptr. 478; Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at §7[i]. 
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owner’s breach of contract.195  The perception of contractors that NDFD 
clauses will not be universally enforced under California common law is 
supported by the existence of three other California statutes that affect 
their enforceability: 1) California Civil Code section 2782(b), which 
voids all provisions in construction contracts with public agencies that 
intend to impose on a contractor, or relieve a public agency from, 
liability for the active negligence of a public agency;196 2) California 
Civil Code section 1670.5, which provides that California courts may not 
enforce contractual provisions that are held to be unconscionable;197 and 
3) California Civil Code section 1442, which provides that California 
“courts must strictly construe forfeiture provisions [of a contract] against 
the party on whose behalf they are invoked.”198
Although California was among the first states to enact legislation 
limiting the enforceability of NDFD clauses, section 7102 provides only 
limited protection for California contractors against application of the 
unfair and inefficient “no damage for delay” clause.199  The California 
legislature should therefore follow the example of a growing number of 
states that have responded to public policy concerns by enacting broader 
legislation to limit the enforcement of NDFD clauses.200
One significant limitation of section 7102 is its restricted 
application only to construction contracts involving a “public agency,” a 
term defined elsewhere in the Code to mean state and local government 
entities.201  The California legislature has been silent as to the 
enforceability of NDFD clauses in private construction contracts, despite 
the fact that many of the same policy concerns apply to private and 
public contracts alike.  The legislature’s failure to address the issue of 
NDFD clauses in private contracts was due to the fact that the passage of 
195 Brunner, 74 A.L.R.3d 187 at § 7[f] . 
196 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
197 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (Westlaw 2011); JAMES ACRET, ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO 
CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES 277 (2d ed. 1990). 
198 Milenbach v. Comm’r, 318 F.3d 924, 936 (9th Cir. 2003); Richard A. Lord, Conditions 
and Promises Which Would Cause a Forfeiture or Penalty, in 14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 42:2 
(4th ed. 2010), available at Westlaw WILLSTN-CN § 42:2. 
199 See Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in Florida Public 
Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425, 446, 456-64 
(2002) (providing a survey of state legislation limiting the enforceability of NDFD clauses). 
200 See id. at 455-64. 
201 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 4401 (Westlaw 2011) (“‘Public agency,’ as defined in this chapter, 
includes the State, its various commissions, boards and departments and any county, city, district or 
state agency authorized to enter into contracts for public work.”); see Marc M. Schneier, Severin
Doctrine Bars Subcontractor’s Pass-Through Claim, Because Under California Law a ‘No 
Damages for Delay’ Clause Shields the Prime Contractor from Liability to the Sub, in 30 NO.1
CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION REPORTER 15 (2009). 
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section 7102 was intended to simply codify what were already well-
recognized judicial exceptions to the enforcement of NDFD clauses in 
the state.202  Thus, the legislature assumed that the existing common-law 
exceptions would continue to shield private contractors from harsh 
forfeitures suffered in association with NDFD clauses. 
However, the recent result of Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham203 reveals 
the dangers of continued silence.204  In Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, a 
federal court applying California law found that NDFD clauses were not 
per se unenforceable in all private contracts.205  In reaching its 
202 ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE 
CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 16.02; see Stephen G. Walker, 
Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6 CONSTRUCTION LAW 9, 10 (1985-1986) 
(stating that, at the time section 7102 was passed, “California construction lawyers have long felt 
that a ‘no damage for delay’ clause would not be enforced where unreasonable delays have been 
caused by the project owner.”); 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 98 (describing the Legislature’s intent in 
enacting section 7102 as follows: “Existing law provides that contract provisions in construction 
contracts of public agencies, and subcontracts thereunder, which limit the contractee’s liability to an 
extension of time for delay for which the contractee is responsible and which delay is unreasonable 
under the circumstances involved, and not within the contemplation of the parties, shall not be 
construed to preclude the recovery of damages by the contractor or subcontractor.  This bill would 
provide that no public agency may require the waiver, alteration, or limitation of the applicability of 
this law and would provide that any such waiver, alteration, or limitation is void.” (emphasis 
added)).
203 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, Builders, Inc. v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 667 (2008) 
(discussed in the Introduction of this Comment). 
204 See Schneier, 30 NO.1 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION REPORTER at 15 (noting that California 
law has been silent on the issue of whether NDFD clauses are enforceable in public contracts, and 
stating that the Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham court determined that “the only California case setting 
common law limits on the enforceability of “no damages” clauses—was superseded by the 
enactment of Public Contract Code § 7102”); see also Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No 
Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in 
California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), 
www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/public-works/federal-court-holds-
no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federal-public-works-projects-in-california/
(“The Harper/Nielson-Dillingham court . . . held that ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in contracts 
between private parties on federal projects are per se enforceable under California law.”); 
Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 667 (holding that “outside of Cal. Pub. Cont. Code § 
7102, which applies to ‘construction contracts of public agencies and subcontracts thereunder,’ 
neither the California legislature nor the California Supreme Court has set forth any exceptions to 
enforceability of express ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in agreements between private parties.”).  
But see Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se 
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE 
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/ 
public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federal-
public-works-projects-in-california/ (arguing that “it is not clear that the Claims Court correctly 
interpreted California law, or whether a California court deciding the issue would reach the same 
conclusion”).
205 Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “No Damage for Delay Clauses” Are Per Se 
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE 
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/ 
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conclusion, the court reasoned that previous case law that expressly 
applied common-law exceptions to the enforceability of NDFD clauses 
in private contracts had been superseded by the enactment of section 
7102.206  Because the common-law exceptions no longer applied, the 
court found that an “express and unambiguous” NDFD clause constituted 
an “iron-bound bar” against potential liability as between private 
contractors and subcontractors in California.207  It is unknown whether a 
California court interpreting the same laws would reach this conclusion, 
creating even greater uncertainty for owners and contractors attempting 
to predict the import of NDFD clauses in private contracts.208
A second limitation of section 7102 is its exclusive applicability to 
NDFD clauses that are both “unreasonable under the circumstances 
provided” and “not within the contemplation of the parties,”209 rather 
than applying to all NDFD clauses in the event of owner-caused delay.  
As previously discussed, NDFD clauses are inherently unreasonable 
because they impose upon contractors virtually incalculable liability 
associated with owner-caused delay.210  Furthermore, because 
contractors are unable to control the performances of owners and their 
agents, public policy should dictate that owner-caused delays are outside 
of the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.211  At 
present, these additional restrictions create an undesirable result: even in 
public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federal-
public-works-projects-in-california/.
206 Schneier, 30 NO.1 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION REPORTER at 15 (stating that “[t]he Harper
court found that Hawley—the only California case setting common law limits on the enforceability 
of ‘no damages’ clauses—was superseded by the enactment of Public Contract Code § 7102”). 
207 Harper/Nielsen-Dillingham, 81 Fed. Cl. at 678-79. 
208 Robert T. Sturgeon, Federal Court Holds “‘No Damage for Delay Clauses’” Are Per Se 
Enforceable on Federal Public Works Projects in California, CONSTRUCTION & INFRASTRUCTURE 
LAW BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), www.constructionandinfrastructurelawblog.com/2010/03/articles/ 
public-works/federal-court-holds-no-damage-for-delay-clauses-are-per-se-enforceable-on-federal-
public-works-projects-in-california/ (“It is not clear that the Claims Court correctly interpreted 
California law, or whether a California court deciding the issue would reach the same conclusion.”). 
209 CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 7102 (Westlaw 2011). 
210 See Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1877 (2005). 
211 See Hawley v. Orange Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 27 Cal. Rptr. 478, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1963) (citing the prevailing public policy that “[a] contract will not be so construed as to put one 
party at the mercy of the other”); Harris v. Klure, 23 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) 
(recognizing that in interpreting a contractual provision, courts as a matter of public policy should 
“avoid an interpretation which will make the contract unusual, extraordinary, harsh, unjust or 
inequitable”); see also Grandoff & Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public Policy 
Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 12 (Oct. 2001) (“A no damage for delay clause which on its face imposes a 
penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default, is contrary to 
public policy.”). 
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public contracts when the owner causes delay, an unfair and inequitable 
NDFD clause will nevertheless be upheld unless a court exercises its 
discretion in determining that the disputed delay was both unreasonable 
and unforeseen by the parties.212  This is true even though section 7102 
was enacted to bring California statutory law in line with common-law 
treatment of NDFD clauses,213 and California courts have rarely enforced 
NDFD clauses to preclude the recovery of costs incurred as a result of 
owner-caused delays.214  The current language of section 7102 allows 
continued judicial discretion over the determination of whether a 
particular delay is unreasonable or not within the contemplation of the 
parties.  Such judicial discretion is undesirable because it will inevitably 
lead to inconsistent results, lingering uncertainty and protracted litigation 
between the parties.215
V. CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The current limitations of California Public Contract Code section 
7102 should be resolved by amending the statute to include language 
similar to that of Ohio Revised Code Annotated section 4113.62(C): 
212 See Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald Constr. Co., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 596-
97 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding delay caused by a prime contractor’s concealment of project conditions 
to be unreasonable, thus voiding the application of a “no damage for delay” clause under CAL. PUB.
CONT. CODE § 7102); see Hawley, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (stating that it is a question of fact as to 
whether parties intend no damage for delay provision to preclude recovery of costs incurred by 
owner directed changes and owner caused delays); see Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses In 
Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REV. 471, 483-84 (1978) (explaining that the 
determination of whether a particular form of delay was beyond the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of contracting is a question of foreseeability). 
213 Stephen G. Walker, Statutory Responses to “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 9, 10 (1985-1986); see ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., CONSTRUCTION 
DISPUTES: REPRESENTING THE CONTRACTOR 477 (3d ed. 2001), available at Westlaw CDRTC s 
16.02. 
214 Howard Contracting, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595–96 (explaining that “California courts 
generally held that ‘no damage for delay’ clauses in public contracts did not apply to delays arising 
from a breach of contract caused by the other party to the contract”); see McGuire & Hester v. City 
& Cnty. of S.F., 247 P.2d 934 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (a no damage for delay clause did not bar 
contractor’s recovery of delay damages caused by the failure of the city, for whom the work was 
being done, to perform its agreement to obtain rights of way prior to commencement of work); see
Maurice L. Bein, Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of L.A., 321 P.2d 753 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (an owner 
who concealed conditions it knew would later cause delay was estopped from asserting a no damage 
for delay clause to avoid liability). 
215 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1869 
(“The question of whether any given no damages for delay clause is judicially enforceable is 
ultimately a very difficult one.”). 
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(1) Any provision of a construction contract, agreement, or 
understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made a 
part of a construction contract, agreement, or understanding, that 
waives or precludes liability for delay during the course of a 
construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate result 
of the owner’s act or failure to act, or that waives any other remedy for 
a construction contract when the cause of the delay is a proximate 
result of the owner’s act or failure to act, is void and unenforceable as 
against public policy. 
(2) Any provision of a construction subcontract, agreement, or 
understanding, or specification or other documentation that is made 
part of a construction subcontract, agreement, or understanding, that 
waives or precludes liability for delay during the course of a 
construction subcontract when the cause of the delay is a proximate 
result of the owner’s or contractor’s act or failure to act, or that waives 
any other remedy for a construction subcontract when the cause of the 
delay is a proximate result of the owner’s or contractor’s act or failure 
to act, is void and unenforceable as against public policy.216
The Ohio statute is broader than California Public Contract Code section 
7102, in that it applies to all construction contracts, both public and 
private.217  Additionally, the Ohio statute mirrors legislation in 
Washington218 and North Carolina219 by rendering NDFD clauses void 
under all circumstances when the delay is caused by an owner.220
By adopting language to this effect, California would render all 
NDFD clauses void in instances of owner-caused delay.  This would 
eliminate the need for judicial determination of whether owner-caused 
delays are unreasonable or were within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of contracting, thus alleviating some of the uncertainty 
contractors face in determining whether an NDFD clause will be 
enforced under section 7102.  Furthermore, this language would also 
address issues of fundamental fairness, by preventing one party to a 
construction contract from being placed at the mercy of another’s 
negligence,221 and by furnishing all parties with legal remedies for 
216 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4113.62(C)(1), (2) (Westlaw 2011). 
217 Susan Sisskind Dunne, “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 38, 40 
(1998). 
218 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.360 (Westlaw 2011). 
219 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-134.3 (Westlaw 2011). 
220 Dunne, “No Damage for Delay” Clauses, 19 CONSTRUCTION LAW. at 40. 
221 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 284 (2011). 
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injuries received.222  Such statutory recognition that owner-caused delays 
should not preclude a contractor’s ability to recover delay damages 
would be more consistent with California’s common-law precedent.223
Additionally, by revising section 7102 as suggested, California 
would expand its statutory protections to cover instances of owner-
caused delay in all construction contracts, which could prevent 
contractors in federal works and private contracts from suffering harsh 
results similar to those in Harper/Nielsen Dillingham.
CONCLUSION
The modern construction process is inherently complex, and delays 
caused by any one party may result in significant financial damages to 
others.224  Therefore, it is not surprising that parties seek contractual 
methods of protecting themselves from liability associated with 
construction delays.225  However, the NDFD clause has proven itself to 
be a draconian instrument226 that operates in contrast to public policy 
interests227 and functions as an ineffective tool for apportioning the risks 
of construction delays.228  A range of alternate methods exist through 
222 See J. Bert Grandoff & Patricia E. Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A 
Public Policy Issue, FLA. B. J. 8, 12 (Oct. 2001) (“A no damage for delay clause which on its face 
imposes a penalty on a contractor by denying a legal remedy, while excusing owner default, is 
contrary to public policy.”). 
223 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 
3D § 27:85 (2010), available at Westlaw MILCALRE § 27:85. 
224 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., 1 BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 1:2 (2010), available at Westlaw BOCL § 1:2; see John W. Hinchey, Visions 
for the Next Millennium, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK § 2.01[A] (1999) (illustrating that a 
construction project of average complexity may involve between five and fifteen firms working on 
the design process, as well as forty to a hundred companies that are engaged in construction and 
many more companies hired to supply materials and services necessary to complete the project); see
S. GREGORY JOY, EUGENE J. HEADY & JAMES E. STEPHENSON, ALTERNATIVE CLAUSES TO 
STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 7 (2010), available at Westlaw ACSCC s 1.02 (explaining 
that ordinary construction projects require the participation and risk the financial resources of a large 
number of parties).  “If one falls down, many others may follow.  The chain of risk extends far 
beyond those who have direct contracts with a failing party.”  Id. 
225 Carl S. Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1857, 
1858 (2005). 
226 See Douglas S. Oles, “No Damage” Clauses in Construction Contracts: A Critique, 53
WASH. L. REV. 471 (1978); see Alain Lecusay, The Collapsing “No Damages for Delay” Clause in 
Florida Public Construction Contracts: A Call for Legislative Change, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 425 
(2002). 
227 See Grandoff & Davenport, The “No Damage for Delay” Clause: A Public Policy Issue,
FLA. B. J. at 14. 
228 See Beattie, Apportioning the Risk of Delay in Construction Projects: A Proposed 
Alternative to the Inadequate “No Damages for Delay” Clause, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1884. 
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which parties are able to allocate the risk of loss in a meaningful manner 
that will not result in total forfeiture.229  Thus, the absence of NDFD 
clauses will not burden parties in the construction industry. 
Through enacting California Public Contract Code section 7102, 
California has taken an important step toward protecting contractors 
from an NDFD clause’s harsh effects, but this is not enough.  Additional 
legislative action is necessary to address strong public policy concerns 
surrounding NDFD clauses, as well as to clarify how NDFD clauses 
should be treated by California courts.  The California legislature should 
respond to these concerns by revising section 7102 to extend the existing 
statutory protections to all public and private contracts when the owner 
causes delay, thereby joining the federal government and the growing 
number of states and professional associations that have decided not to 
impose or enforce NDFD clauses under such conditions. 
229 See id. at 1879-84; see also Cheri Turnage Gatlin, Contractual Limitations on the Right to 
Recover Delay Damages and Judicial Enforcement of Those Limitations, 22 CONSTRUCTION LAW.
32 (2002). 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss2/6
